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Beyond the Universal Soldier: Combat Trauma in 
Classical Antiquity  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 Like an epistemological echo of Donovan’s famous song The Universal Soldier, 
the belief that the combatant’s susceptibility to post-traumatic stress disorder/combat 
stress injury1 is diachronically universal is slowly gaining ground.2 Gabriel, for instance, 
argues that the experience of close-quarters battle would leave ancient armies burdened 
with thousands of psychological causalities.3 Shay offers an influential reading of the 
Iliad and the Odyssey as tales of both Achilles’ and Odysseus’ adverse psychological 
reactions to intense combat.4 Tritle argues, similarly, that Epizēlos, the uninjured 
Athenian hoplite who, according to Herodotus, went blind during the battle of Marathon, 
was suffering from conversion disorder,5 that Aristodemos’ voluntary death during the 
battle of Plataea was motivated by survivor guilt,6 Xenophon’s portrait of the Spartan 
                                                 
1 This terminology, of course, reflects not only the value judgments attracted by this contentious subject, 
but also the breadth of human experience it covers (see, for instance, Shay’s foreword to Figley and Nash’s 
excellent edited volume Combat Stress Injury: Theory, Research, and Management (London, 2007), as 
well as W. Nash, ‘Combat/Operational Stress Adaptations and Injuries’, pp.33-63, in the same volume). 
For the sake of analytical clarity, and to avoid the confusion entailed by the adoption of often indistinct and 
overlapping typologies (such as combat related PTSD, combat shock, battle fatigue, perpetration induced 
PTSD etc), this article uses both terms as shorthand for the full range of adverse psychological reactions to 
combat.   
2 See B. Shephard, A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 2001), pp.385-99, and esp. D. Summerfield, ‘A Critique of Seven Assumptions behind 
Psychological Trauma Programmes in War-affected Areas’, Social Science and Medicine, Vol.48 (1999), 
pp.1449-62, which both challenges the presumption that PTSD is universal and context independent, and 
the Western psychological neo-colonialism that underpins it. For further discussion specific to the ancient 
world, see A. Melchior, ‘Caesar in Vietnam: Did Roman Soldiers Suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder?’ G&R, Vol.58 (2011), pp.209-33. 
3 R. Gabriel, Soldiers’ Lives Through History: The Ancient World (London, 2007), pp.12-15. 
4 J. Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (New York, 1995), 
Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming (New York, 2002).  
5 Hdt. VI.117.2-3, with L. Tritle, From Melos to My Lai: War and Survival (London, 2000), p.64. 
6 Hdt. IX.71.1-4; cf. I.82.1-8; VII.231.1-232.1, IX.71.1-4; Paus. II.38.5; Thuc. V.41.2, with Tritle, From 
Melos to My Lai, pp.74-7. 
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commander Clearchos is the description of a man suffering from PTSD,7 and that the 
unnamed individuals described by Gorgias who were terrified by the sight of warriors 
armed for combat, as well as those driven mad by the frightful things they had seen, were 
traumatised by their experiences of war.8 Naturally, such retrospective diagnoses are not 
restricted to ancient Greece. The concept of PTSD/CSI has been applied to individuals in 
17th century China,9 Pepys’ diary,10 Shakespeare11 and even in the Bible.12  
Typically, such retrospective diagnoses rest on an implicit belief in historically 
transcendental human equivalence, that is to say, that since modern humans are the 
equivalent of ancient humans, they are not only both equally susceptible to PTSD, but the 
presence or absence thereof can be detected by the same diagnostic criteria, currently 
embodied in DSM-V.13  This view has already been accepted by many leading theorists 
                                                 
7 Xen. Anab. II.6.1-16, with Tritle, From Melos to My Lai, pp.55-78. Consider also L. Tritle, ‘Hector’s 
Body: Mutilation of the Dead in Ancient Greece and Vietnam’, AHB, Vol.11 (1997), pp.123-36. 
8 Gorg. Hel. 15-17, with L. Tritle, 'Gorgias, the Encomium of Helen and the Trauma of War', Clio's Psyche, 
Vol.16 (2009), pp.195-9. Additional discussion of this intriguing text can also be found in Tritle's A New 
History of the Peloponnesian War (Oxford, 2010), pp. 158-60, as well as his own contribution to this 
volume ('"Ravished Minds" in the Ancient World') and that offered by Raaflaub ('War and the City: The 
Brutality of War and its Impact on the Community'). 
9 L. Struve, ‘Confucian PTSD: Reading Trauma in a Chinese Youngster’s Memoir of 1653’, History and 
Memory, Vol.16 (2004), pp.14-31.  
10 R. Daly, ‘Samuel Pepys and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder’, The British Journal of Psychiatry, Vol.143 
(1983), pp.64-8. Interestingly, although Daly acknowledges the possibility that PTSD is a historically-
contingent socio-cultural artefact, his diagnosis of Pepys leads him to accept (p.67) ‘the temporal constancy 
of post-traumatic stress disorder.’ 
11 M. Trimble, ‘Post-traumatic Stress Disorder: History of a Concept’, in C. Figley (ed.), Trauma and its 
Wake I: The Study and Treatment of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (New York, 1985), pp.5-14. 
12 C. Haughn and John Gonsiorek, ‘The Book of Job: Implications for Construct Validity of Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder Diagnostic Criteria’, Mental Health, Religion and Culture, Vol.12 (2009), pp.833-45. 
13 An acronym referring to the 5th edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Washington, 2013). Scholarship which predates this publication 
naturally refers to earlier editions, namely DSM-III (1980) and DSM-IV (1994). For the evolution of the 
diagnostic criteria set out in both, as well as the controversial revisions now embodied in DSM-V, see 
Shephard, A War of Nerves, pp.355-68, with A. Adler et al., ‘A2 Diagnostic Criterion for Combat-Related 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder’, Journal of Traumatic Stress, Vol.21 (2008), pp.301-8; B. Gersons and I. 
Carlier, ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: The History of a Recent Concept’, The British Journal of 
Psychiatry, Vol.161 (1992), pp.742-8; P. Schnurr, ‘The First 20 Years’, Journal of Traumatic Stress, 
Vol.21 (2008), pp.1-2, ‘The Changing Face of PTSD Diagnosis’, Journal of Traumatic Stress, Vol.22 
(2009), pp.1-2, ‘PTSD 30 Years On’, Journal of Traumatic Stress, Vol.23 (2010), pp.1-2. 
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and clinicians,14 and given the ongoing exponential increase in publications about 
PTSD/CSI, it seems likely that such studies will continue to proliferate until the 
universalist premise that underpins them becomes dogma.15 Yet, whilst this premise, that 
susceptibility to PTSD/CSI is diachronically universal, to put the matter in Popperian 
terms, cannot be verified by the parade of white swans it has generated, it can be refuted 
by the production of one single black swan, and it is the aim of this article to provide just 
such a creature.16 
 
1.2. Methodology 
 
 The methodology usually adopted by the universalists is characterised by the 
search for supporting sources which appear to describe conduct which could conceivably 
fit the current diagnostic criteria for PTSD/CSI, which, once identified, are deployed in 
support of a retrospective diagnosis thereof.17 This methodology is admirably direct, yet, 
it inevitably produces subjective and unfalsifiable readings of isolated pieces of ancient 
evidence,18 and more importantly, it fails to recognise that PTSD/CSI results from the 
                                                 
14 Consider, for instance, C. March and N. Greenberg, ‘The Royal Marines’ Approach to Psychological 
Trauma’ in C. Figley and W. Nash (eds.), Combat Stress Injury: Theory, Research, and Management 
(London, 2007), pp.247-60, also, from the same volume, W. Nash, ‘Combat/Operational Stress Adaptations 
and Injuries’, pp.33-63; J. Spira, J. Pyne and B. Wiederhold, ‘Experiential Methods in the Treatment of 
Combat PTSD’, pp.205-18. 
15 Emergence of dogma: Melchior, ‘Caesar in Vietnam’, pp.209-23. Proliferation: Schnurr, ‘PTSD: 30 
Years On’, pp.1-2, which demonstrates that this increase in interest, reflected in the number of PTSD-
focused publications, which grew from only 900 in 1984 to nearly 9000 in 2010, is simply phenomenal. 
Furthermore, as the source of these figures reveals (the United States’ Department of Veterans’ Affairs’ 
Published International Literature On Traumatic Stress (PILOTS) Database, which can be found at 
www.ptsd.va.gov), this trend is continuing.  
16 A methodology famously outlined by Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, 1959).   
17 For paradigmatic examples, see Daly, ‘Samuel Pepys and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder’, pp.64-8; 
Tritle, From Melos to My Lai, p.64, pp.74-7, pp.123-36. 
18 Tritle’s interpretation of Aristodemos’ death (From Melos to My Lai, pp.74-7) is an excellent example. 
His interpretation is perceptive, persuasive and consistent with the ancient evidence, but so too is its most 
obvious competitor, that Aristodemos chose a glorious death in combat instead of a life degraded by the 
irrevocable destruction of his social status (cf. Xen. Lac. Pol. IX.1.6, with additional discussion in J. 
Crowley, The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite: The Culture of Combat in Classical Athens (Cambridge, 
2012), pp.86-8, pp.106-7, pp.117-19. 
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interaction of two variables, namely the human being and his or her environment.19 This 
fact is critical, of course, because neither variable is historically transcendental: the 
attitudes and core beliefs adopted by combatants change, as does the socio-military 
environment in which they fight. This, naturally, allows for the possibility that although 
the modern combatant and his socio-military environment combine to produce a 
susceptibility to PTSD/CSI, a very different historically specific combination could just 
as easily reduce, suppress or even eliminate that susceptibility.  
 To investigate this possibility, this article will contrast two combatants and their 
respective environments. Since the current diagnostic criteria for PTSD/CSI directly 
derives from the experiences of U.S. Vietnam veterans, the first of these combatants has 
to be the modern, specifically 20th Century, American infantryman.20 Similarly, since the 
American infantryman’s adverse psychological reactions to combat have been 
retrospectively applied to ancient Greece, and since he is one of the few warriors from 
classical antiquity for which a reasonable degree of narrative evidence survives, the 
                                                 
19 C. Aldwin, Stress, Coping, and Development: An Integrative Perspective (New York, 1994); R. Lazarus, 
‘Cognitive-motivational-relational theory of Emotion’ in Y. Hanin (ed.), Emotions in Sport (Champaign, 
Illinois, 2000), pp.39-64; J. Szalma, ‘Individual Differences in Stress Reaction’ in P. Hancock and J. 
Szalma (eds.), Performance under Stress (Burlington, Vermont, 2008), pp.323-57, also Nash, ‘The 
Stressors of War’ in C. Figley and W. Nash (eds.), Combat Stress Injury: Theory, Research, and 
Management (London, 2007), pp.11-31, with ‘Combat/Operational Stress Adaptations and Injuries’, pp.33-
63. 
20 See above, Section 1.1, n.13, with B. Moore and G. Reger, ‘Historical and Contemporary Perspectives of 
Combat Stress and the Army Combat Stress Control Team’ in C. Figley and W. Nash (eds.), Combat Stress 
Injury: Theory, Research, and Management (London, 2007), pp.161-81, also Shephard, A War of Nerves, 
esp. pp.355-68. Of course, American soldiers were not fundamentally dissimilar to those troops fielded by 
other Western nations, nor were their responses to the experience of combat. Earlier drafts of this paper, in 
fact, proposed the 'Western soldier' as the modern point of comparison, but the American soldier was 
eventually adopted for three reasons: firstly, it was his experiences that generated the current debate 
regarding adverse reactions to combat; secondly, the available evidence overwhelming relates to American 
troops; thirdly, it was hoped the focus on one specific combatant during one specific time period would 
help minimise, to some degree at least, the kind of analytically unhelpful generalisations unavoidably 
entailed by encompassing different cultures and time periods. Similar reasons explain why the Athenian 
hoplite was adopted as the ancient point of comparison, instead of a more general 'Greek' warrior.    
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second combatant will be the Athenian hoplite.21 To maximise the force of the 
comparison and to avoid the charge that a modern apple is being compared to an ancient 
orange, these combatants have been chosen because they perform exactly the same 
tactical role, that is to say it is their grim task to close with and kill the enemy.  
To ensure methodological clarity, the analytical distinction between the individual 
and his environment will be maintained throughout. Accordingly, examination of both 
the modern and ancient paradigms will focus on the combatant’s core norms and values, 
since they determine what is or is not traumatic, as well as the three most pertinent 
aspects of the combatant’s environment, namely, the social environment, the tactical 
environment and lastly, the technological environment. Thereafter, the susceptibility of 
both paradigms to PTSD/CSI will be assessed and then compared. Finally, this article 
will conclude by considering the implications of this comparison for the continued 
viability of the universalist position. 
 
2.1. The American Infantryman and his Environment 
 
Obviously, it is important to acknowledge that significant points of continuity 
exist between the two historical case studies examined by this article. Like the American 
infantryman, the Athenian hoplite found the experience of combat intensely frightening,22 
                                                 
21 See above, Section 1.1, ns.3-8. For the nature of hoplite combat, see esp. A. Schwartz, Reinstating the 
Hoplite: Arms, Armour and Phalanx Fighting in Archaic and Classical Greece (Stuttgart, 2009), also J. 
Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon (London, 1970); G. Grundy, Thucydides 
and the History of his Age (London, 1911), pp.267-73; V. Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry 
Battle in Classical Greece (London, 2000). Note, however, the competing model ably advanced by H. van 
Wees in Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities (London, 2004), esp. pp.184-97. For a summary of the debate 
between adherents of both positions, see Crowley, The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite, pp.53-62.  
22 A wide convergence of evidence attests not only to the experience of fear (Aristoph. Birds 289-90, 1470-
81, Clouds 350-5, Peace 444-6, 673-8, 1172-85, 1295-1304, Wasps 10-30, 592, 820-5; Eur. Bacch. 303-4; 
Lys. X.8-9, 12, 21-4, XVI.17; Thuc. IV.34.7, VII.80.3; Tyrt. XI.22; Xen. Hell. IV.3.17), but also to the 
appearance of its physical manifestations (Aristoph. Kn. 1055-6, Peace 239-41, 1179-81; Hdt. VII.231; 
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and like his modern counterpart, he too suffered from exposure to the elements and all the 
other physical hardships associated with active service.23 Nevertheless, the American 
infantryman carried into combat a highly specific set of norms and values shaped, 
regardless of personal belief, by the pervasive influence of Christianity.24 Although once 
a fighting religion, by the outbreak of the Second World War, Christianity’s former 
belligerence had been replaced by a non-violent ideal stressing personal moral conduct,25 
mercy, love, and respect for human life,26 with such principles most forcefully expressed 
in the Christian duty to ‘turn the other cheek’ and to ‘love thy neighbour’, as well as, of 
course, by the 6th Commandment, popularly translated as ‘thou shalt not kill.’27 
Like the norms and values he adopted, the American infantryman’s social 
environment was just as distinctive. In the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, men served in 
military units comprised of complete strangers drawn from diverse geographical locations 
and socio-economic circumstances.28 Naturally, in such a social environment, cohesion 
required time to develop. However, in American combat units, which, during the period 
under discussion, demonstrated a particular propensity for both poor performance in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hom. Il. XIII.279-83; Plut. Ages. XXX.2-4, Arat. XXIX.5; Polyaen. Strat. III.4.8; Thuc. V.10.8; Xen. 
Hiero VI.3.7. 
23 Aristoph. Peace 348; Thuc. II.58.1-3, VII.47.1-3, 59.2-87.6; Xen. Hunt. XI.2, Lac. Pol. IV.7.  
24 S. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command (Oklahoma, 2000), p.78, also R. 
Holmes, Acts of War (London, 2003), p.58, p.71; J. McManus, The Deadly Brotherhood: The American 
Combat Soldier in World War II (Novato, California, 1998), pp.154-5, pp.229-35, p.279; S. Stouffer et al., 
Studies in Social Psychology in World War Two, Volume. II: The American Soldier: Combat and its 
Aftermath (Princeton, 1949), pp.172-191. 
25 B. Ehrenreich, Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War (London, 1997), p.163, pp.165-
174; M. Hogg and G. Vaughan, Social Psychology (Harlow, 2002), pp.460-2; Holmes, Acts of War, p.289. 
26 J. Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare (London, 
1999), p.224; Ehrenreich, Blood Rites, pp.165-6; J. Keegan, A History of Warfare (London, 1993), pp.48-9. 
27 Deut. V.4-21; Ex. XX.1-17; Luke 6.31; Mark XII.31; Matt. VII.12, with further discussion in Bourke, An 
Intimate History of Killing, pp.215-41. 
28 See esp. Holmes, Acts of War, p.82, pp.79-93. For extended discussion and an extremely valuable 
collection of evidence, see S. Stouffer et al., Studies in Social Psychology in World War Two, Volume I: 
The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life (Princeton, 1949).   
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combat and PTSD/CSI, the process of inter-personal affiliation was retarded by the 
operation of three mutually reinforcing policies.29 
The first of these policies was individual replacement, consequent to which, for 
instance, units which sustained casualties during World War Two were not withdrawn 
from the line and reinforced, as was usually the case with the armies of Britain and 
Germany,30 but kept up to strength by the allocation of individual replacements drawn 
from a replacement depot.31 The second was individual rotation, which found its most 
famous manifestation during the Vietnam War. This policy operated on the principle that 
a soldier’s ability to endure combat was finite,32 and consequently, during the Vietnam 
War, soldiers were limited to a twelve-month tour of duty,33 with officers serving only six 
in order to facilitate the proliferation of command experience.34 The third policy, aimed 
at increasing operational efficiency, assigned each ostensibly interchangeable and 
transposable combatant an M.O.S., a military occupational speciality, by which the 
                                                 
29 R. Gabriel and P. Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (New York, 1978), pp.x-9, 
pp.29-41, p.50, pp.55-8; W. Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat: Leadership and 
Societal Influence in the Armies of the Soviet Union, the United States, North Vietnam, and Israel 
(Washington, 1985), pp.31-2. See also S. Wesbrook, ‘The Potential for Military Disintegration’ in S. 
Sarkesian (ed.), Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military (London, 1980), 
pp.274-6. 
30 E. Shils and M. Janowitz, ‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II’, Public 
Opinion Quarterly, Vol.12 (1948), pp.287-8; M. van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army 
Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, 1982), pp.42-60, pp.74-9, pp.90-1, also R. Glenn, Reading Athena’s 
Dance Card: Men Against Fire in Vietnam (Annapolis, 2000), pp.85-6.  
31 Stouffer et al., Studies in Social Psychology II, pp.242-89; van Creveld, Fighting Power, pp.75-7, pp.90-
1, pp.166-8. 
32 See esp. C. Wilson, The Anatomy of Courage (London, 1987), p.xvi, also Nash, ‘Combat/Operational 
Stress Adaptations and Injuries’, pp.48-59; Shephard, A War of Nerves, pp.143-60. 
33 Extended to thirteen months for marines, for which see G. Lewy, ‘The American Experience in Vietnam’ 
in S. Sarkesian (ed.), Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military (London, 1980), 
pp.102-3. 
34 Gabriel and Savage, Crisis in Command, pp.3-28, pp.70-2; A. Hoiberg, ‘Military Staying Power’ in S. 
Sarkesian (ed.), Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military (London, 1980), 
pp.232-4; Lewy, ‘The American Experience in Vietnam’, pp.102-3. Note, however, the argument offered 
by Gabriel and Savage (Crisis in Command, pp.3-28, pp.51-96), namely that this policy, despite its stated 
aim, was actually motivated by careerism. 
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military matched man to task,35 consequent to which individuals were assigned and re-
assigned whenever and wherever units required their services.36  
Whatever their current combat assignment, these individuals operated in a tactical 
environment determined by modern weapons systems, particularly the rifle, machine gun 
and the artillery piece, which together produce what military theorists call the dispersed 
battlefield.37 This deadly arena, traversed by red hot, razor sharp shrapnel and high-
velocity gunfire, forced the soldier to seek safety in cover and concealment, and most 
importantly, to reduce the lethal affects of explosive and automatic weapons, by 
remaining, at all times, physically distant from his comrades.38 
Of course, modern weapons not only combine to produce a highly distinctive 
tactical environment, they, together with supporting military assets and equipment,  also 
combine to produce a highly distinctive technological environment. Therein, the 
American infantryman faced a range of threats, not only from other similarly armed and 
equipped infantrymen, but also from armour, close-air support, indirect fire weapons such 
as mortars and artillery pieces, not to mention tactical obstacles like landmines and 
improvised explosive devices.39 In doing so, he was supported by sophisticated logistical 
                                                 
35 W. Hauser, ‘The Will to Fight’ in S. Sarkesian (ed.), Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the 
Volunteer Military (London, 1980), pp.187-8, pp.204-5; Hoiberg, ‘Military Staying Power’, pp.213-14. 
36 Gabriel and Savage, Crisis in Command, pp.117-43; Henderson, Cohesion, p.18; Hauser, ‘The Will to 
Fight’, pp.194-5, pp.204-5; A. Kellet, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle (London, 
1982), p.43; L. Sorley, ‘Prevailing Criteria: A Critique’ in S. Sarkesian (ed.), Combat Effectiveness: 
Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military (London, 1980), pp.73-89; Wesbrook, ‘The Potential for 
Military Disintegration’, pp.266-7. 
37 Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, p.92; J. Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle 
(London, 1998), p.136; Marshall, Men Against Fire, p.60. 
38 Consider, for instance, the British Army’s Section Battle Drills, reproduced in The Volunteer’s Pocket 
Book (Beverley, 1991), pp.110-12, with further discussion in Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, p.77; 
Glenn, Introduction to Marshall’s Men Against Fire, p3; Marshall, Men Against Fire, p.22, p.46, p.145; W. 
van Zanten, Don’t Bunch Up (and Some Notable Exceptions): One Marine’s Story (Connecticut, 1993), 
pp.9-10, p.15. For the grim consequences of transgression, see, for example, G. Sajer, The Forgotten 
Soldier (London, 1991), pp.321-4. 
39 See above, Section 2.1, n.38. 
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systems and technological aids. His personal load carrying equipment allowed for the 
efficient carriage of considerable amounts of his three basic staples, food, water and 
ammunition, and when his supplies were expended, he could be resupplied in the field, 
usually, in the final quarter of the 20th Century, by helicopter. Consequently, the 
American infantryman could maintain contact with the enemy for extended periods, and 
since, from the Vietnam period onwards, he was typically equipped with tactical night-
vision aids, he could also do so around the clock.40 
2.2. The American Infantryman’s Susceptibility to PTSD/CSI 
 
It seems obvious, therefore, that the 20th Century American infantryman entered 
combat with a historically-specific set of norms and values, and he operated in a 
historically-specific social, tactical and technological environment. What is not obvious, 
however, is that his pre-battle socialisation and every aspect of his environment 
combined to enhance his susceptibility to PTSD/CSI.  
To start with, the American infantryman’s Christianised norms and values, 
stressing peace, mercy and the sanctity of human life, were so stunningly incongruent 
with his tactical role, to close with and kill his enemy, that, as Marshall observed, during 
World War Two, such beliefs constituted a ‘handicap’41 which inhibited the 
infantryman’s ability to fight and to kill.42 Naturally, this inhibition was militarily 
undesirable, and during the period under consideration, the U.S. military employed four 
                                                 
40 Holmes, Acts of War, pp.115-35; Nash, ‘The Stressors of War’, pp.18-22; M. van Creveld, ‘Technology 
and War II: From Nuclear Stalemate to Terrorism’ in Charles Townshend (ed.), The Oxford History of 
Modern War (Oxford, 2005), pp.341-63, also MCRP (Marine Corps Reference Publication) 6-11C 
(Washington, 2000), pp.55-75. For an overview of modern infantry combat and the role of rotary-wing 
aircraft, see L. Cacutt, Combat (London, 1992), pp.11-55, pp.122-57. 
41 Marshall, Men Against Fire, p.67, pp.76-9. 
42 Marshall, Men Against Fire, p.78; Stouffer, Studies in Social Psychology II, p.77, with further discussion 
in R. Baron & D. Byrne, Social Psychology (New Delhi, 2004), p.453; Bourke, An Intimate History of 
Killing, p.224, p.247, p.251, p.260; Ehrenreich, Blood Rites, p.10, pp.165-174; Hogg & Vaughan, Social 
Psychology, p.460-1; Nash, ‘Combat/Operational Stress Adaptations and Injuries’, pp.48-59. 
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main techniques aimed at overcoming it. Firstly, it endeavoured to re-socialise its 
recruits, that is to say, to engineer the elimination of incongruous norms and values and 
their replacement with those designed to facilitate combat.43 Secondly, it attempted to 
desensitise the soldier,44 for instance, through the deification of killing, manifested by the 
worship of the ‘spirit of the bayonet’45 and the chanting of mantras such as ‘kill, kill, 
kill’.46 Thirdly, it supported its soldiers’ inclination to deny their lethal activities, by 
encouraging them to see combat as nothing more than a series of drills identical to those 
carried out during training.47 Fourthly, as Grossman observes, after particular poor 
performance during the Second World War, it sought to bypass any resistance to killing 
by embedding Pavlovian/Skinnerian conditioning techniques into skill at arms training, 
which henceforth presented the soldier with a stimulus in the form of a pop-up, man-
shaped target, for which the conditioned response was swift and accurate engagement, 
                                                 
43 S. Bidwell, Modern Warfare: A Study of Men, Weapons and Theories (London, 1973), p.1; Glenn, 
Reading Athena’s Dance Card, pp.1-126; D. Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to 
Kill in War and Society (London, 1996), pp.xxiii-xxii, pp.1-4, pp.249-61; Bourke, An Intimate History of 
Killing, pp.69-102; Henderson, Cohesion, p.18, p.49, p.51, pp.75-6; Holmes, Acts of War, pp.7-18, pp.36-
73, pp.136-75, pp.204-69, pp.270-359; Kellet, Combat Motivation, pp.67-78; P. Caputo, A Rumor of War 
(New York, 1977), pp.8-10; B. Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict and Combat (London, 1988), p.110; 
Stouffer, Studies in Social Psychology I, pp.472-3, Studies in Social Psychology II, pp.85-6. For notable 
examples, see  Caputo, A Rumor of War, pp.8-10, p.36; T. O’Brien, If I Die in a Combat Zone (London, 
1995), p.51; S. Sassoon, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer (London, 1966), pp.16-17.    
44 Grossman, On Killing, pp.248-261, with Section 2.2, n.43, also Bidwell, Modern Warfare, pp.61-3; P. 
Watson, War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology (Harmondsworth, 1980), pp.181-3. 
For the concept of ‘battle inoculation’ generally, see Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, pp.87-8; 
Holmes, Acts of War, pp.53-4; Watson, War on the Mind, pp.141-44. 
45 See, for example, O’Brien, If I Die in a Combat Zone, p.51; cf. Sassoon, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, 
pp.16-17, with additional discussion in Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, pp.87-8, pp.92-3, pp.153-4. 
46 Grossman, On Killing, pp.251-2. For instance, in an attempt to enhance their ability to kill in the jungles 
of South Vietnam, Caputo’s hatchet-wielding and war-crying sergeant ordered his nervous recruits to chant 
‘ambushes are murder and murder is fun.’ See A Rumor of War, p.36. 
47 Grossman, On Killing, p.233, p.256; cf. Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, pp. 225-35; Holmes, Acts 
of War, p.366. This, of course, would also explain the widely attested calls of ‘endex’ (military shorthand 
for end of exercise) by British troops when hostilities ceased on the Falklands, for which see V. Bramley, 
Excursion to Hell: The Battle for Mount Longdon (London, 1991), p.173; cf. Gray, The Warriors, p.136. 
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positively reinforced through the fall of the target, as the enemy ‘died’, and thereafter 
through progression in rank and associated privilege.48  
Such techniques, during combat, when extreme stress often impairs high-level 
cognition, enhanced the American infantryman’s ability to overcome his inhibition and 
kill, but they did so only at considerable psychological cost.49 By killing, the American 
infantryman committed an irreversible act that transgressed his core values, and as 
psychologists recognise, such psychologically damaging transgressions are often closely 
associated with subsequent diagnoses of PTSD/CSI.50  
The successful performance of his battlefield role, therefore, was psychologically 
toxic to the American infantryman, as, of course, was the social environment in which he 
was compelled to discharge it. As Schachter’s experiments have demonstrated, when 
human beings perceive danger, they experience feelings of anxiety which stimulate the 
desire to affiliate with other human beings.51 This inter-personal affiliation then reduces 
anxiety, and in socio-military contexts, it enhances morale, endurance, psychological 
                                                 
48 Grossman, On Killing, pp.xxiii-xxii, pp.1-4, p.177, pp.249-61, p.313; Watson, War on the Mind, pp.49-
57, pp.89-104. For Marshall’s influence on these reforms, see Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, 
pp.69-102; Holmes, Acts of War, pp.7-18, pp.36-73, pp.136-75, pp.204-69, pp.270-359, also Glenn’s 
introduction to Marshall’s Men Against Fire, pp.1-11, together with his own application of Marshall’s 
theories in Reading Athena’s Dance Card, pp.1-126. 
49 Grossman, On Killing, pp.xviii, p.233, also D. Grossman and L. Christensen, On Combat: The 
Psychology of Deadly Conflict in War and Peace (New York, 2008), pp.2-137, with O’Brien, If I Die in a 
Combat Zone, pp.50-1 and Holmes, Acts of War, pp.41-2. 
50 Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, esp. pp.221-71; Grossman, On Combat, pp.356-64; R. MacNair, 
Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress: The Psychological Consequences of Killing (Westport, 
Connecticut, 2002), esp. pp.1-29;  S. Maguen et al., ‘The Impact of Reported Direct and Indirect Killing on 
Mental Health Symptoms in Iraq War Veterans’, Journal of Traumatic Stress, Vol.23 (2010), pp.86-90; 
Nash, ‘Combat/Operational Stress Adaptations and Injuries’, pp.48-59, ‘The Stressors of War’, pp.25-7; 
Shephard, A War of Nerves, pp.369-76; Shay, Odysseus in America, pp.19-34, pp.107-12, pp.231-41; 
Stouffer et al., Studies in Social Psychology II, p.77, pp.172-91, with extended discussion in Shay, Achilles 
in Vietnam.  
51 For these experiments, see S. Schatcher, The Psychology of Affiliation (Stanford, California, 1959), with 
Kellet, Combat Motivation, p.xix, pp.98-103, p.287, pp.320-1, also Ehrenreich, Blood Rites, pp.22-95; 
Henderson, Cohesion, p.108, p.163; Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict and Combat, p.159; Stouffer et al., 
Studies in Social Psychology II, p.96, pp.99-100, pp.130-49; Wilson, The Anatomy of Courage, p.127.  
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resilience, and small-unit cohesion, thereby enabling the soldier to withstand challenges 
which would break an unaffiliated combatant.52  
For the combatant, then, affiliation offers profound protection against 
psychological breakdown. Given time and social stability, the vast majority of modern 
Western soldiers affiliate easily with their peers,53 yet, the operation of individual 
replacement, individual rotation and the constant reassignments which resulted from the 
M.O.S. system effectively denied the American infantryman the same quality of 
opportunity.54 Instead, he operated in a social environment characterised by chronic 
personnel turbulence, which revealed its deleterious effects most graphically during the 
war from which, tellingly, the very concept of PTSD is derived: Vietnam.55 There, the 
operation of individual rotation and individual replacement resulted in a never-ending 
sequence of inexperienced officers to lead an ever-changing collection of troops whose 
incessant rotation and replacement inhibited affiliation precisely where it was needed 
most: in combat.56 Naturally, such a social environment was perfect for the proliferation 
                                                 
52 C. A. du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle (Roots of Strategy Book 2: 3 Military Classics, 
Mechanicsburg, 1987), p.125, p.136; Ehrenreich, Blood Rites, pp.22-95; Glenn, Reading Athena’s Dance 
Card, p.114; Kellet, Combat Motivation, p.xix, p.41, p.45, pp.98-101, pp.277-9, p.300, pp.320-1, p.331; 
McManus, The Deadly Brotherhood, pp.273-6, p.278, pp.286-8; Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict and 
Combat, p.115; Shils and Janowitz, ‘Cohesion’, pp.284-5, p.302; Stouffer et al., Studies in Social 
Psychology II, p.80, p.100, p.107, pp.130-49; van Creveld, Fighting Power, pp.91-100; Watson, War on the 
Mind, p.91; Wesbrook, ‘The Potential for Military Disintegration’, p.252; Wilson, The Anatomy of 
Courage, p.xvi, p.94, p.174. 
53 See above, Section 2.1, n.28, with additional discussion in Kellet, Combat Motivation, p.42, p.123, 
p.320; Stouffer et al., Studies in Social Psychology II, pp.278-80, and for one particularly swift example, 
see McManus, The Deadly Brotherhood, p.280. 
54 See above, Section 2.1, ns.29-36. 
55 See above, Section 1.1, n.13. 
56 Gabriel and Savage, Crisis in Command, pp.3-41, pp.50-96, also R. Beaumont and W. Snyder, ‘Combat 
Effectiveness: Paradigms and Paradoxes’ in S. Sarkesian (ed.), Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, 
and the Volunteer Military (London, 1980), p.46; Glenn, Reading Athena’s Dance Card, pp.84-108, 
pp.115-9; Hauser, ‘The Will to Fight’, pp.192-4, p.205; Henderson, Cohesion, p.18; Hoiberg, ‘Military 
Staying Power’, pp.231-4; Lewy, ‘The American Experience in Vietnam’, pp.102-3; Shalit, The 
Psychology of Conflict and Combat, p.170; cf. du Picq, Battle Studies, pp.122-3. 
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of PTSD/CSI, and unfortunately for the American soldier, this profound propensity was 
further exacerbated by his tactical environment. 
In combat, the affiliative desire generated by intense fear produces an irresistible 
longing for the psychological support offered by the close physical proximity of other 
human beings,57 the most visible expression of which is the irrational tendency of modern 
troops to ‘bunch’ under fire.58 Since this increases the lethal effects of both explosive and 
automatic weapons, modern infantry tactics require troops to maintain their personal 
intervals, and when under effective enemy fire, to seek cover and concealment.59 This 
offers effective protection against enemy weapons, yet, as each soldier goes to ground, 
his unit, no matter how cohesive, is transformed into a collection of mutually isolated 
individuals who engage their enemy alone, not only denied the comfort offered by the 
close physical proximity of their peers but actually segregated from them, and therefore 
bereft of the benefits offered by their protective presence. This tactical environment, then, 
virtually ensured that the American infantryman was psychologically most vulnerable 
precisely at the point of severest psychological stress.60   
Worse still, this psychological vulnerability was further enhanced by the 
technological environment in which the American infantryman operated. This presented 
the infantryman with a range of threats, to which, as Lazarus demonstrated, he could 
                                                 
57 C. Cooley, Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind (London, 2005), pp.23-42; du Picq, Battle 
Studies, pp.110-14, p.125, p.141; Kellet, Combat Motivation, p.320; Marshall, Men Against Fire, p.41, 
p.141, p.145; W. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War (London, 1921), pp.140-3; Wesbrook, 
‘The Potential for Military Disintegration’, pp.251-2. See also Section 2.2, n.51. 
58 Holmes, Acts of War, pp.24-5; Kellet, Combat Motivation, p.98, p.100, pp.320-1; McManus, The Deadly 
Brotherhood, p.276; Stouffer et al., Studies in Social Psychology II, pp.283-4; van Zanten, Don’t Bunch 
Up, pp.9-10, p.15; cf. Thuc. V.71.1. 
59 See, for instance, the British Army’s No.2 Section Battle Drill, reproduced in The Volunteer’s Pocket 
Book, p.111; cf. G. Bransby, Her Majesty’s Vietnam Soldier (London, 1992), p.13, with Section 2.1, ns.37-
8, Section 2.2, n.58. 
60 Marshall, Men Against Fire, p.47, pp.124-7, p.129, with Section 2.2, n.52. 
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respond in two very different ways, either taking direct action to remove or escape the 
threat, or, if this was not possible, by taking palliative action to reduce its stressful effects 
through denial, drugs, alcohol or humour.61 Obviously, the type of response adopted by 
the infantryman is largely determined by two variables, namely the kind of threat facing 
him and his personal capacity to counter it. Thus, for instance, the infantryman can 
employ direct action against other troops, that is to say, by killing, suppressing or 
breaking contact with them, but he is forced to rely on palliative action when under 
artillery bombardment, since his personal weapon cannot be employed against a target 
ten or more kilometres distant from his own position.62  
This distinction is, of course, important because direct action removes the threat, 
and in consequence, it is psychologically benign. In contrast, palliative action  leaves the 
combatant in contact with the noxious agent, and as a result, it is psychologically 
malignant.63 This explains why, during World War Two, as Stouffer and his colleagues 
discovered, American soldiers found the lethal threat presented by enemy crew-served 
weapons, such as MG34s and 42s, reasonably manageable, because they could respond 
with direction action, but they were intensely fearful of enemy artillery and air support, 
precisely because the only real response they had to this kind of threat was palliation.64 
Naturally, this enhanced the American soldier’s psychological vulnerability, because, 
                                                 
61 R. Lazarus, Psychological Stress and the Coping Process (New York, 1966), with a good overview of 
this theory outlined in W. Buskist, N. Carlson and G. Martin, Psychology, (London, 2004), pp.723-4.  
62 See, esp. Holmes, Acts of War, pp.28-30, with Section 2.1, ns.37-8, and Section 2.2, n.59. 
63 Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, p.159, pp.248-9; Holmes, Acts of War, pp.28-30, pp.139-40, 
pp.211-12, pp.230-2, p.255, p.261; J. Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the 
Somme (London, 1976), pp.70-1; Kellet, Combat Motivation, p.256, p.277, p.300; F. Richardson, Fighting 
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exception to this dichotomy is where direct action involves killing, in which case the psychological benefit 
derived from the removal of the threat is potentially tainted by the moral transgression entailed thereby (see 
Section 2.2, n.50). 
64 Stouffer et al., Studies in Social Psychology II, p.83, pp.232-41. 
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against the most lethal threats he faced, the only response available to him was 
psychologically toxic.  
This vulnerability was further aggravated by his extended exposure to combat. 
Typically well trained and equipped, and supported by a sophisticated logistical 
apparatus, he was able and often expected to maintain contact with the enemy for many 
months at a time.65 In addition, his ability to conduct operations during the hours of 
darkness ensured that the progressive exhaustion he experienced consequent to the 
physical and mental demands of extended campaigning were further compounded by 
sleep deprivation, which, as psychologists recognise, is a toxic combination which lowers 
the soldier’s mental resilience and intensifies his vulnerability to psychological 
breakdown.66  
The American soldier, therefore, demonstrated a profound propensity for 
PTSD/CSI as a result of a convergence of historically-specific factors. Firstly, the 
Christianised norms and values he took to the battlefield ensured that the successful 
performance of his battlefield role was psychologically toxic. Secondly, his social 
environment reduced or even denied him the psychological benefits of protective 
affiliation. Thirdly, his tactical environment robbed him of the comfort he would 
otherwise have derived from the physical proximity of his peers and forced him to face 
his enemy alone, isolated and psychologically exposed. Fourthly, his technological 
environment presented him with threats which frequently required psychologically 
harmful responses, and the logistical and technological support he received during 
                                                 
65 See above, Section 2.1, n.40. 
66 Grossman, On Combat, pp.14-29, On Killing, pp.69-73; Holmes, Acts of War, pp.115-35; Nash, ‘The 
Stressors of War’, pp.18-22; MCRP 6-11C, pp.55-75; Stouffer et al., Studies in Social Psychology II, 
pp.73-7. 
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operations often compelled him to face those threats in an exhausted, sleep deprived and 
psychologically vulnerable condition. How then does this situation compare to that faced 
by the Athenian hoplite? 
 
3.1. The Athenian Hoplite and his Environment 
 
 Like the American soldier, the Athenian hoplite carried into battle with him a 
highly distinctive set of norms and values. Unlike those influenced by Christianity, 
however, these were profoundly pugnacious. The explanation for this, of course, lies in 
the peculiar geo-political structure of Classical Greece, where a thin veneer of cultural 
unity overlay an aggressive agglomeration of small, fiercely independent and mutually 
antagonistic poleis.67 In this singular environment, war, which the Greeks accepted as a 
legitimate tool of interstate relations,68 proliferated unconstrained by enforceable 
international laws69 or effective methods of conflict resolution.70 Consequently, since the 
                                                 
67 See Hdt. VIII.144.2; Isoc. IV.43, 81; Plat. Rep. V.470c-d, with P. Low, Interstate Relations in Classical 
Greece: Morality and Power (Cambridge, 2007), pp.33-73; van Wees, Greek Warfare, pp.6-18. For 
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Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton, 2011). 
68 Consider esp. Plat. Laws. I.625e-26a, with M. Finley, ‘War and Empire’ in M. Finley (ed.), Ancient 
History: Evidence and Models (London, 1985), pp.67-70; Low, Interstate Relations, p.108, n.111; van 
Wees, Greek Warfare, pp.3-5, pp.19-33, also K. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and 
Aristotle (Oxford, 1974), pp.160-1, pp.310-6; Y. Garlan, War in the Ancient World: A Social History 
(London, 1975), p.18; A. Momigliano, ‘Some Observations on Causes of War in Ancient Historiography’ 
in A. Momigliano (ed.), Studies in Historiography (London, 1966), pp.112-26; Tritle, From Melos to My 
Lai, pp.28-9; G. Zampaglione, The Idea of Peace in Antiquity (London, 1973), pp.1-18, pp.28-35, pp.60-4. 
69 D. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity (Cambridge, 2001), pp.154-5, p.174, p.177; Low, Interstate 
Relations, pp.77-128; L. Mitchell, ‘Philia, Eunoia and Greek Interstate Relations’, Antichthon, Vol.31 
(1997), p.41, p.44; C. Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Vol.II 
(London, 1911), p.28, p.30, p.32, p.43, p.58; G. Sheets, ‘Conceptualising International Law in Thucydides’, 
AJPh, Vol.115 (1994), p.54-6, p.62; cf. G. Herman, ‘Treaties and Alliances in the World of Thucydides’, 
PCPhS, Vol.36, (1990), p.84; H. Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’, Yale Law Journal, 
Vol.106 (1997), p.2604.  
70 Although arbitration clauses often appeared in Greek treaties (see, for instance, Thuc. V.79.1, with M. 
Tod, International Arbitration Amongst the Greeks (Oxford, 1913), pp.174-5; Low, Interstate Relations, 
pp.105-8; C. Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Vol.I (London, 
1911), pp.129-130, p.138), in the absence of effective means of enforcement, they rarely achieved their aim 
(consider, for example, Thuc. I.78.4, 85.2, V.15.4, with S. Ager, ‘Why War? Some Views on International 
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sovereignty and survival of his polis was secured by the warrior, the Greeks held non-
martial aspects of manhood secondary to battlefield bravery,71 which they considered an 
unqualified social good that both defined a man and determined his social worth.72  
Naturally, as Athenian society was profoundly performative,73 a warrior had to 
demonstrate rather than merely declare his bravery,74 either by dying on the battlefield,75 
or by performing creditably in combat and earning the acclaim of those who witnessed 
his creditable conduct.76 Accordingly, for the Athenians, war was more than a means of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arbitration in Ancient Greece’, EMC, Vol.12 (1993), p.8, pp.10-11; Tod, International Arbitration, p.189, 
also F. Adcock and D. Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (London, 1975), pp.230-2, p.239, p.244; 
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p.18, pp.28-35). 
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Courage in the Athenian Orators’ in R. Rosen and I. Sluiter (eds.), Andreia: Studies in Manliness and 
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Manliness and Courage in Classical Antiquity (Boston, 2002), pp.144-65; Dover, Greek Popular Morality, 
p.41, pp.161-7; D. Pritchard, ‘The Fractured Imaginary: Popular Thinking on Military Matters in Fifth 
Century Athens’, AH, Vol.28 (1998), pp.44-9; A. Rademaker, ‘“Most Citizens are Europrôktoi Now”: 
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Courage in Classical Antiquity (Boston, 2002), pp.115-25; Roisman, ‘The Rhetoric of Courage’, pp.126-
43, The Rhetoric of Manhood: Masculinity in the Attic Orators (London, 2005), pp.1-2, pp.7-8, p.67, pp.84-
101, pp.105-6, pp.188-92, pp.205-14; W. Runciman, ‘Greek Hoplites, Warrior Culture, and Indirect Bias’, 
The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol.4 (1998), pp.740-2; Zampaglione, The Idea of 
Peace in Antiquity, pp.60-4.  
73 Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, pp.153-6; Christ, The Bad Citizen, pp.10-12, pp.38-9, pp.112-8; 
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74 Xen. Symp. VIII.43; Lyc. I.104; Lys. XVIII.24, XXX.26; Xen. Hell. VII.1.21, 4.32. 
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defending or advancing the interests of Athens, it was a rite of passage which guarded the 
boundary between adolescence and manhood.77    
Of course, although armed conflict was embedded in the Athenian kosmos, the 
Athenians were not blind to the allure of peace: they enjoyed both its benefits and its 
tranquillity, and they recognised that since war entailed destruction, loss and sorrow, it 
should be avoided where possible. Nevertheless, despite this recognition, it is striking 
that expressions of humanistic sentiment are not only relatively infrequent in Athenian 
discourse, but most were generated by the Peloponnesian War, and those that were not 
are completely overshadowed by the dominant orthodoxy which fully acknowledged the 
human cost of war but wholeheartedly embraced it nonetheless.78 
Again, this is easy to explain. Athens was an interventionist imperial powerhouse 
which ruthlessly deployed the institution of war to compete for dominance in one of the 
harshest geo-political environments in history.79 Unsurprisingly, since it formed the 
foundation upon which Athenian greatness was built, the Athenians venerated war,80 and 
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not just as an abstract concept, but also as a tangible human experience reduced to its 
three most basic components: fighting, killing and dying, a triumvirate which together 
forms the most brutal distillation of war: combat. 
For the Athenians, the ability to fight in close combat was the highest and most 
glorious expression of the masculine ideal.81 Similarly, the desired end result of that 
engagement, the death of the opponent, was also something eagerly embraced. Such 
hardheartedness stems, in no small part, from a principle central to Athenian culture, 
namely that of helping friends and harming enemies, a doctrine not only deeply 
internalised by Athenian men, but also one they felt obliged to obey.82 This exerted such 
normative force that Athenian men felt compelled to respond violently to their enemies, 
even if they were fellow citizens, with whom they were ideally expected to collaborate.83 
Naturally, external enemies invited not collaboration but elimination, and so on the  
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II.1.3, 19, 6.35, V.5.10, with Dover, Greek Popular Morality, pp.180-4; Roisman, The Rhetoric of 
Manhood, pp.59-63, also Low, Interstate Relations, pp.38-43. 
83 Dem. LIV.13-14, 18-19, 34-6, 42, XXI.2, 20, 28, 40, 74, 76, 120, 141; cf. Andoc. I.56; Plat. Rep. 
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battlefield, lethal violence was not only morally unambiguous, it was also utterly 
unconstrained.84  
The Athenians, however, did not only kill their enemies, they were also killed by 
them, and so many men would have witnessed the deaths of their comrades at close hand 
on more than one occasion.85 Yet, whilst such losses were lamented,86 the Athenians 
nevertheless chose to construe death in combat not as a premature end, but as a timely 
culmination.87 Accordingly, at Athens, the war dead enjoyed a special social significance. 
Having demonstrated their unimpeachable courage they reflected undying glory on both 
state and surviving family,88 and in return for their sacrifice, they escaped mortality, and 
as something close to heroes, they were immortalised by inscriptions, and annually 
honoured by the spectacular state funeral Athens held for her fallen.89 Thus, for the 
Athenians, death, far from dimming the bright glory of combat, was instead its most 
glorious aspect.  
                                                 
84 See above, Section 3.1, n.82. 
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89 See esp. Thuc. II.34.1-46.2; IG I3 1162, also Lys. II.80, with D. Bradeen, ‘Athenian Casualty Lists’, 
Hesperia, Vol.33 (1964), pp.16-62, ‘The Athenian Casualty Lists’, CQ, Vol.19 (1969), pp.145-59; F. 
Jacoby, ‘Patrios Nomos: State Burial in Athens and the Public Cemetery in the Kerameikos’, JHS, Vol.64 
(1944), pp.37-66; N. Loraux, The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City (London, 
1986), esp. pp.15-131. 
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These bellicose views also received religious amplification. Admittedly, Ares, 
who personified the more sinister aspects of war, appears to have revolted the Greeks.90 
Furthermore, religious sentiments, by underpinning the respect normally accorded to 
temples, truces, heralds, holy days and enemy dead, undoubtedly offered a welcome 
degree of amelioration.91 Nevertheless, there is no hint of pacifism in Greek religion, and 
the gods with whom men communed, usually through the medium of animal sacrifice, 
during which, tellingly, the victim had its throat cut with an edged weapon,92 were often 
warriors themselves, and as such, they both approved of the institution of war93 and 
accepted its utility in interstate relations.94 As a result, for the Greek warrior, the gods 
were a potential source of support, and if their favour could be obtained by means of 
offerings and promises,95 they could be induced to work for him and against his 
enemies.96  
                                                 
90 N. Fisher, Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece (Warminster, 1992), 
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with Goodman and Holladay, ‘Religious Scruples in Ancient Warfare’, p.151; Lissarrague, ‘The World of 
the Warrior’, pp.39-51; Roisman, ‘The Rhetoric of Courage’, p.132.  
95 Aristoph. Kn. 841-59; Diod. Sic. XV.85.1, XVI.22; Hdt. VI.76.1-2, VIII.64.1, IX.61.2-62.1; Isoc. VII.10;  
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XVIII.3-5, XIX.6, XX.4, XXI.1, Per. XVII.1-2, Them. VIII.2-3, XIII.2-3, XV.2; Thuc. I.32.2, 118.3, 
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Hanson (ed.), Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience (London, 1991), pp.228-49; M. Jameson, 
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1991), pp.197-227; R. Parker, ‘Sacrifice and Battle’ in H. van Wees (ed.), War and Violence in Ancient 
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This ensured that the Greek warrior’s relationship with his gods was both 
profound and pitiless, as two particularly grim examples offered by Xenophon 
demonstrate. In the first, he recounts how the Athenians promised to sacrifice a goat to 
Artemis for every Persian they killed at Marathon. The goddess, however, was so 
generous that the slaughter of Persians outstripped the supply of animals, and although 
the Athenians subsequently sacrificed by annual instalments of five hundred goats, their 
blood-debt was so great that, according to Xenophon, it was still being paid nearly a 
hundred years after it had been incurred.97 In the second, even more dreadful example, 
Xenophon describes an awful Spartan massacre of corralled and utterly helpless enemies, 
which, in his view, was not only something that a Greek warrior might legitimately pray 
for, but its successful execution, in this instance, signified by ‘heaps of corpses’, could 
actually be considered a ‘gift of heaven’.98   
Although shocking to a modern reader, Xenophon’s ruthless religious 
Weltanschuung is entirely understandable. His formative years had been spent in the 
shadow of his city’s patron, Athena, the warrior goddess par excellence. Her citizens  
paraded their military power in her honour during her festival, the Panathenaea.99 They 
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97 Xen. Anab. III.2.10-14; cf. Hdt. VI.117.1. For similar examples, see Xen. Anab. III.2.9, IV.8.25 and 
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depicted her, in Athenian art, as the personification of Athenian martial virtue,100 
standing both with and for the Athenian hoplite, not only fighting at his side, but also 
celebrating his victories and grieving for his losses.101 Most revealingly, they portrayed 
her, in the warrior departure scenes often found on Attic pots, displacing the hoplite’s 
wife or mother in order to assist him while he armed himself for battle against those 
hostile to her polis.102  
Certainly, then, the norms and values the Athenian hoplite carried with him into 
battle were strikingly different to those of the American infantryman, and so too was the 
social environment in which he fought. As a convergence of evidence demonstrates, the 
Athenian hoplite mobilised, deployed and fought alongside his fellow demesmen.103 This 
is significant because the deme, the smallest subdivision of the Athenian body-politic, 
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was also by far the most socially cohesive.104 Most were small, rather internally-focused 
face-to-face communities of whose members were religiously, economically, politically 
and socially integrated.105 As a consequence, affiliation amongst demesmen was so 
profound and normative106 that any damage to this affiliative relationship was, for the 
unfortunate demesmen concerned, not merely transgressive, it was actually shameful.107 
The tactical environment in which these men fought was also very different. The 
Athenian hoplite was a heavy infantryman who sacrificed speed and agility in order to 
maximise his capacity for close-quarters combat. To protect himself from troops, such as 
cavalry and light infantry, whose capacity for tactical mobility surpassed his own, he 
fought in a phalanx, a close-order formation predicated on mutual protection and tactical 
interdependency.108 Insofar as its table of organisation can be reconstructed, the Athenian 
phalanx seems to have been subdivided by ten medium-sized subunits, called taxeis, with 
each taxis in turn subdivided by an unknown number of smaller units called lochoi.109 As 
the evidence suggests, demesmen were assigned to the same lochos, and deployed in 
tactically distinct files of men, usually eight deep, laterally arranged to produce eight 
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serried ranks. Consequently, when the Athenian hoplite met his enemy, he did so 
surrounded by and in close order with his comrades.110   
The technological environment in which the Athenian hoplite fought, which was 
largely determined by muscle-powered weapons, was also highly distinctive.111 As he 
discharged his main tactical duty, to close with and kill enemy hoplites, the principal 
threat the Athenian hoplite faced was from the stabbing spears and slashing swords of 
similarly armed and equipped opponents.112 Moreover, since he was normally protected 
by friendly cavalry and light infantry during deployment, the advance to contact and 
whilst in contact with the enemy, if he was victorious, the weapons wielded by enemy 
hoplites were the only threat he would face on the battlefield.113 However, if he was 
ineffectively screened by supporting arms, or if that protective screen was dispersed or 
his own phalanx atomised by defeat, he might find himself exposed to the javelins thrown 
by enemy cavalry and light infantry, as well as the sling stones and arrows of enemy 
slingers and archers.114  
In comparison to the modern infantryman, then, the range of threats faced by the 
Athenian hoplite was relatively restricted, and so too was the logistical and technological 
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support he received. Typically, he mobilised with only a few days self-supplied 
rations,115 and after they were consumed, he was forced to live by purchasing food from 
nearby markets when in neutral or friendly territory, and by plunder when in that of the 
enemy.116 Accordingly, since he could live by plunder only when enemy crops were ripe, 
extended operations in enemy territory, such as those conducted by the Athenians on 
Sicily, were difficult to sustain. In addition, without the technological aids required for 
the amplification of ambient light, night operations, like the disastrous Athenian attack on 
Epipolae, were extremely risky, and therefore also comparatively rare.117   
 
3.2. The Athenian Hoplite’s Susceptibility to PTSD/CSI 
 
It seems obvious, therefore, that the Athenian hoplite entered combat with a 
historically-specific set of norms and values, and that he operated in a historically-
specific social, tactical and technological environment. What is not obvious, however, is 
that his pre-battle socialisation and every aspect of his environment combined to produce 
a historically-specific resistance to PTSD/combat stress injury.  
 Clearly, the religiously amplified and militarised norms and values internalised by 
the Athenian hoplite were stunningly congruent with his tactical role, which was to close 
with and kill his enemy. Consequently, he did not require re-socialisation prior to active 
service since he was, from childhood, continually conditioned for combat.118 Thus, 
instead of regretting the killing of his enemies, the Athenian hoplite gloried in their 
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deaths. Xenophon, for instance, describes how, at the point when an enemy formation 
breaks and close-quarters combat gives way to the slaughter of fleeing and panic-stricken 
men, the emotion typically experienced by pursuing hoplites was unbridled joy. 
Furthermore, he adds, the pride men take in their own personal tally of kills tempts so 
many to exaggerate that their boastful claims exceed the actual body count.119 The same 
feelings are also unambiguously expressed in a famous epitaph, to Pythion of Megara. 
That claims Pythion was a good man because of his capacity to help his friends and harm 
his enemies, which he apparently demonstrated by helping to save three Athenian taxeis, 
which had been cut off near his homeland, probably in 446 BC, and by personally killing 
seven men in close-quarters combat. As Dover perceptively observes, the fact that, 
according to the inscription, Pythion then entered the underworld ‘having brought sorrow 
to no one among all the men who dwell on the earth’120 demonstrates that  the sorrow of 
enemies was not merely inconsequential, it was actually beyond reflective 
consideration.121  
 The successful performance of his battlefield role, therefore, was not 
psychologically toxic to the Athenian hoplite, nor was he forced to perform it without the 
full support his social environment. On the contrary, he mobilised, deployed and fought 
together with his fellow demesmen, and so, unlike the American infantryman, whose 
military service entailed the ongoing disruption of his social environment, the Athenian 
hoplite met his enemy surrounded by the men of own cohesive community whose 
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protective affiliation both shielded him from the corrosive effects of apprehension and 
enhanced his psychological resilience.122 
 This psychological resilience was further reinforced by the Athenian hoplite’s 
tactical environment, which virtually ensured the close physical proximity that 
combatants crave. Unlike the American infantryman, who sought safety in dispersion and 
often met his enemy isolated from his peers, the Athenian hoplite sought salvation in 
close order, and consequently, when he met his enemy, he was able to do so whilst 
deriving the maximum comfort from the close physical proximity of his surrounding 
comrades.123 
 Finally, the Athenian hoplite’s psychological resilience was further enhanced by 
the technological environment in which he operated. Two aspects of this environment are 
especially notable. The first is that during conventional operations, the main threats he 
faced, that is those presented by other warriors armed with muscled-powered weapons, 
could be countered by the most psychologically benign Lazarus response, namely direct 
action. Specifically, during main force encounters, the Athenian hoplite could eliminate 
the threat he faced from enemy hoplites by closing with and killing them or, if 
overmatched, he could break contact under the cover of friendly cavalry and light 
infantry.124 Indeed, even during a tactical worst case scenario, in which his own phalanx 
was atomised and relentlessly pursued by more tactically mobile troops, the only option 
                                                 
122 See above, Section 3.1, ns.103-10; cf. Section 2.1, ns.28-36, Section 2.2, ns.51-6. 
123 See above, Section 3.1, ns.108-10; cf. Section 2.1, ns.37-8, Section 2.2, ns.57-60. 
124 See above, Section 1.2, n.21, also Section 3.1, ns.112-13. 
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available to the hoplite, uncontrolled flight, usually facilitated by the abandonment of the 
shield, was itself a form of direct action.125 
 The second notable aspect of the technological environment is the limited 
duration in which the Athenian hoplite had to cope with the stresses and strains of the 
ancient battlefield. Main force encounters were mercifully brief, and in the absence of 
sophisticated logistical support, the Athenian hoplite was not typically expected to 
conduct extended operations, nor was he, without the ability to amplify ambient light, 
usually required to fight during the hours of darkness.126 Admittedly, because the Greeks 
generally lacked the technology for breach and the will to storm, siege operations, 
normally conducted by circumvallation, did entail continuous contact with the enemy 
and, in consequence, such operations undoubtedly required a psychologically toxic 
Lazarus response, namely palliation.127 Nevertheless, during conventional operations the 
Athenian hoplite was largely protected against progressive exhaustion and sleep 
deprivation, and all the subsequent psychological vulnerabilities entailed thereby.128   
 The Athenian hoplite, therefore, was profoundly protected against PTSD/CSI as 
a result of a convergence of historically-specific factors. Firstly, the martial norms and 
values he took to the battlefield ensured that the successful performance of his battlefield 
role was not psychologically harmful. Secondly, his social environment allowed him to 
receive all the benefits that protective affiliation could provide. Thirdly, his tactical 
                                                 
125 For the pursuit, see Section 3.1, n.114, and for abandonment of the shield in the course thereof, see 
Aristoph. Ach. 1129, Kn. 367, 389-94, Thes. 812-24, 830-45; Lys. X.8-9, 12, 21, 22-4, 27-30, XIV.4-8, 10, 
XVI.15, XXI.20; Xen. Symp. II.8-19. 
126 See above, Section 3.1, ns.115-17, with the comparative brevity of combat discussed in Schwartz, 
Reinstating the Hoplite, pp.201-22. 
127 Consider, for example, the siege of Plataea, 429 – 27 BC (Thuc. II.71-8, III.20-4, 51-68) and that of 
Syracuse, 415 – 13 BC (Thuc. VI.52-104, VII.1-85). For siege warfare generally, see B. Strauss, ‘Naval 
Battles and Sieges’ in P. Sabin, H. van Wees, and M. Whitby (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and 
Roman Warfare, Volume I. (Cambridge, 2007), pp.237-47; van Wees, Greek Warfare, pp.138-50. 
128 See above, Section 3.1, ns.115-17, Section, 3.2, n.126. 
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environment almost guaranteed him all the comfort he could derive from the physical 
proximity of his peers. Fourthly, his technological environment enabled him to confront 
the threats he faced during conventional operations with the most psychologically benign 
response, and to face those threats with his psychological resilience largely unaffected by 
the insidious effects of exhaustion or sleep deprivation. 
4. Conclusion 
 
 The American infantryman and the Athenian hoplite both performed the same 
tactical role, and this sometimes tempts even the most impressive modern scholars to read 
evidence in way that equates their experiences. Nevertheless, despite the tactical 
similarity of these combatants, it is clear that the norms and values they carried into 
combat, and the social, tactical and technological environments in which they fought, 
were both historically-specific and radically divergent. Furthermore, it would appear that 
these historically-specific and radically divergent circumstances left the American 
infantryman critically vulnerable to PTSD/CSI whilst the Athenian hoplite was 
effectively immunised against the same risk. In Popperian terms, then, the Athenian 
hoplite is a black swan. Consequently, no matter how many white swans are marshalled 
in support of the universalist position, it seems that Donovan and his academic admirers 
are mistaken: the soldier is not, and indeed, can never be, universal.  
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